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Abstract 
 
Suicide is a socio-cultural phenomenon. Reports about suicide from different cultures and eras 
support the opinion that suicide can be a cultivated and normatively recognized act. International 
educated and scientific use of the term suicide produces, conveys and suggests a narrowing of 
reflection. A medical deficit viewpoint has been established, and corresponding theories 
constructed and ‘verified’ to justify the paternalistic interaction with suicidal people. The suicidal 
person is discriminated and isolated on multiple levels in the suicide development process. 
Psychological autopsy studies are driven by deficit- and illness-based approaches and are designed 
and conducted on a low methodological level. 
When suicidal actions are recognized as normal actions, or even interpreted as morally sound, 
medical, political, religious and other guardians of morality and the ruling order oppose such 
understanding and demand sovereignty of interpretation. The conflicts in the suicide field result 
from diverging values and interests, whereby open, controversial and empirically-based public 
discussions are generally avoided. There is a lack of reference in psychiatric and suicidology texts 
to the fact that ‘free will’, ‘free choice’ or ‘free mind’ in modern society are not restricted 
primarily by mental illness, but by socio-economic disadvantage and economic and political 
decisions that lead, among other things, to mental disorders. Cultivation of suicide is not in 
contradiction with prevention of suicide. 
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Suicide, a significant form of dying, is generally excluded from works and introductory overviews 
on thanatology (e.g. Howarth, 2007; Clavandier, 2009). Suicidology, which is in essence a part of 
a part (psychiatry) of the medical system, “neither a science nor a discipline” (Conwell, 2010, p. 
59), but a field or a hierarchically ordered system of subfields (Bourdieu, 1998, 2000), sets store 
by boundaries and exclusion, has its own journals and textbooks and does not concern itself with 
general thanatological theories and research. The term suicidology as used in this text refers to 
mainstream suicidology. A typical sentence encountered in the dominant doxa, the self-evident 
discourse on practices and on which the field rules are based: “The focus of suicidology is not 
necessary completed suicide but above all treatment of suicidal individuals” (Pompili, 2010, p. 1).  
In Ancient Greek and Latin, there was no one specific term for the act referred to in all modern-
day advanced languages as suicide (van Hooff, 1990; Marsh, 2010, p. 79). The ‘matter’ was simply 
addressed and referred to in different ways depending on the context, which also provided 
people with greater flexibility in dealing with it. Commandingly protected and professionally 
watched over, the unwavering international use of the term suicide in its modern form in contrast 
produces, conveys and suggests pathologization and incapacitation. A medical deficit viewpoint 
has been established, and corresponding theories constructed and ‘verified’ to justify the 
paternalistic interaction with suicidal people. “…a desperate person is not only feeling despaired, 
but her reflective abilities are altered. This feature of suicidal people is usually named as 
‘‘narrowing’’ in psychiatric and psychological models and received empirical evidence” 
(Schlimme, 2013, p. 214). While the ‘narrowing (of consciousness)’ construct might be applicable 
to residents of nursing homes (cf. Whitaker, 2010), it does not really constitute a valid generalized 
description of the mental states of suicidal individuals (Feldmann, 2010, p. 199). 
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“The stories we tell about acts that come to be labeled as suicidal are influenced by the 
impoverished language and conceptual apparatus that is available to us. In most ‘suicide talk’ 
whether among professional or lay people, the whole range of acts engaged in by those whose 
behavior is actually or potentially self-destructive are subsumed under the umbrella concept 
suicide and a few variants: parasuicide, attempted suicide, failed suicide, and threatened suicide, 
along with expressions like ‘cry for help’. This poverty of language and concepts reflects rather a 
limited model of suicidal self-harm in which fine distinctions are not made, even in theory, 
perhaps because they are difficult to make in practice. It is misleading and unhelpful in deciding 
upon courses of action in relation to those who act in actually or potentially self-destructive ways 
or are thought to be at risk of doing so” (Fairbairn, 1998, p. 157). 
The catalog of terms and theories used to address actions and events that cause destruction to the 
self or to others remains antiquated and unreflected: suicide, murder, death by natural causes, 
accident, etc. The users of this semantic field share the illusion that suicide is a homogenous 
phenomenon that can thus be unambiguously described, explained and assessed. “This fatal 
reduction in complexity favors the simplification and ideologization of suicide that is 
encountered not only in the medical debate, but also in the publications of legal and medical 
practitioners, theologists and psychologists. Above all, the minority of suicide cases that could 
provide a positive lesson for one part of humanity are ‘drowned’ by the easily diagnosable 
majority.” (Feldmann, 2010, p. 179; translation by the author)  
Attempts to differentiate the term suicide (or killing oneself) are avoided in the legal, 
philosophical, theological and other debates, while the use of a whole range of terms to refer to 
the act of killing someone else (e.g. murder, manslaughter, death penalty, act of self-defense, fatal 
use of force, euthanasia, etc.) in turn adds greater flexibility to the debate. To surmount the 
difficulties raised by the heterogeneity in case structures, contexts and views of the world, suicide 
and its mainstream debate are subjected to a restricted actor model and decontextualized by 
opinion leaders (cf. the reductionist context, theory and culture abstinent attempts at definition in 
Silverman 2011). The psycho-social events that precede a suicide are operationalized into 
normatively prescribed concepts and variables, while their communicative and interactive 
processes and field structures are deconstructed and reconstructed using simple causal models. 
Most suicide experts thus neglect methodological differences and theoretical options in their 
claims that the vast majority of suicides are ‘caused’ by mental illness (cf. Hjelmeland et al. 2012; 
Hjelmeland 2013, p. 7 - 8). Given the problems associated with the operationalization of the term 
‘mental illness’, the lack of diagnosis and other factors, this constitutes an only seemingly well-
proven hypothetical supposition or view, reinforcing the assumption that the dominant construct 
of suicide based on the professional doxa of psychiatry lacks critical scientific rigour, serves 
primarily to keep authority and professional privileges in place and is increasingly losing its 
scientific and everyday viability. Indeed, we can now talk of a globalized hegemony, orthodoxy 
and monopoly view in which science and symbolic capital is abused as legitimate means of 
symbolic and structural violence. 
The argumentation below primarily targets the scientific and professional ‘treatment’ of suicide. 
But before we can discuss this further, we must first take a brief look at the state and governing 
framework without which suicidology would not be able to consummate its work in a quasi-
fundamentalist manner. The modern-day state has adopted elements of traditional moral and 
governance ideology, which are administrated by various institutions (the law, education, 
medicine, social work, etc.). “Laws against suicide or assisted suicide thus represent coercive 
action by the government that imposes the rules of a particular morality, one that derives from 
religion, over another morality with more secular derivations.” (Rubin, 2010, p. 811) 
Bayatrizi (2008), Lester (2003, 2006) and Marsh (2010) deliver insights into the development and 
establishment of the psychiatric ‘regime of truth’ based on functionaries and on suicide as an 
intercultural and transdisciplinary phenomenon. With their largely symbolic capital, the main 
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advocates of mainstream suicidology in contrast promote their basic ideology as universal, 
evidence-based, culturally, politically and economically neutral, and without alternative; they 
dominate the debate in literature and in the quality media. Dogmatic  statements and statements 
of commitment are to be expected from the prominent players: “Suicide at any age is a tragedy 
for the individual, his or her family and friends, and the communities of which they are a part” 
(Conwell,Van Orden & Caine, 2011, p. 1). 
A further observation concerns the reductionist (meta-)theory of suicide found in literature. The 
following example refers to the group of patients who are ‘at the end of their lives’: “Yet for the 
vast majority of these patients, the reason for suicide is not a decision made of their own free 
will, but a frequently treatable mental disorder.” (Vollmann et al., 2008, p. 205; translation by the 
author). This argument is clearly based on a simple ‘theory’: suicide is either a decision that is 
made of our own free will or is caused by a mental disorder. The operationalization of the terms 
suicide, mental disorder, free will and decision conforms to the prevailing medical and ruling 
order, and the ‘theory’ that was ‘confirmed’ by partisan research is not subjected to any further 
critical examination. 
To the constant chagrin of the representatives of powerful institutions, including above all 
medicine, the state, religion and the law, suicide is a battlefield in society that is not as well 
ensnared in their professional grip as cancer or childbirth. “The ultimate threat to a legal order 
built on death control is the individual who refuses to accept law’s prohibition and seeks to self-
style her death.” (Hanafin, 2009, p. 85). While people who commit suicide are no longer subject 
to criminal prosecution, most countries still punish people who help to organize a suicide without 
the statutory authority or professional legitimation to do so. Furthermore, even in countries like 
Germany where assisted suicide is formally exempted from official punishment, ostracism, 
informal punishment, medicalization, stigmatization (Sudak et al., 2008) and mystification are still 
demanded by many experts (psychiatrists, suicidologists, lawyers, etc.) and public speakers 
(functionaries, journalists, etc.). The suicidal person is discriminated and isolated on multiple 
levels. The people affected – and that can be quite a lot of people if suicidality is taken as an 
overall phenomenon – maintain their silence in “doxic submission” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 67, 81; 
2000), or their attempts to communicate ultimately peter out. To strengthen the ideology, 
selected examples are pushed through the filters and transformers of medicine, the media and 
other modern forms of censorship and presented to the general public as deterrents. 
Resistance to the pathologization, medicalization and depreciation of suicide was – and still is – 
generally provided by outsiders, and ignored and symbolically destroyed by state and experts. The 
people and groups who provide resistance are usually denied access to and denounced in the 
media as sick or criminal (c.f. the attempts to bring criminal charges against the German branch 
of the Swiss assisted suicide organization Dignitas) or classified as cultural, ethnic oder 
ideological deviants, whereby this categorization must be gleaned from debate and practices, 
since any public discussion is heavily restricted. These deviants, literati, artists and intellectuals, 
are occasionally granted a ‘moderated’ niche platform, thus facilitating their segregation and 
exclusion from ‘normal citizens’. They are also deemed to be irrational and romantic, while the 
members of the white-coated suicide brigade are praised for their scientific, rational and 
professional merit and have the financial backing to secrete their ritual claims into the media and 
relevant commissions. 
A counter-debate of romantic glorification and scientific marginalization that suits the 
representatives of the fields of medicine and power is constructed. “However, the glorification of 
suicide – suicide as rebellion and opposition against the dominant values of society – may also be 
found in popular culture in the 20th and 21st century, such as rock music and film. The 
glorification of individual resistance communicated by pro-suicide messages on the internet today 
may be traced back to Stoicism and Romanticism, albeit in new forms and with new adversaries” 
(Westerlund, 2012, p. 766). In contrast to this very restricted and calculating willingness to 
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‘recognize” the counter-debate, commendable scientific works offering a different understanding 
of suicide (e.g. by Thomas S. Szasz, David Lester, Jack Douglas, Ursula Baumann or Dagmar 
Fenner) are ignored in journals and medical education because they are not compatible with the 
prescribed modelling and economics of suicide. Despite this suppression of alternative 
perspectives by the professionals and the state, they are still being represented and applied in 
many different forms by various individuals and groups. When such heterodox representations 
reach the media, the messages they contain are written off by the experts as prejudicial, incorrect, 
immoral, irrational and/or sick. 
The effect of hidden power should also not be ignored. The following message to potential 
suicides continues to remain effective: Do it in a way that is as off-putting and repulsive as possible! (c.f. 
Feldmann, 1998). A further implicit message that is supported even by the high priests of 
suicidology is as follows: When you commit suicide, you die a dishonorable death, no matter how you do it! 
Different variations on these themes are transmitted in the messages sent by different senders: 
medicine, religion, the law, the media and politics. These implicit and explicit messages have so 
far succeeded in developing their stabilizing effect on prevailing discourse and practices to a 
sufficient extent to prevent alternative discourse and practices from becoming the center of 
attention. These assumptions and the hypotheses that can be derived from it have as yet not been 
the subject of any quality empirical studies, and this situation is unlikely to change in the short- 
and medium term. 
Notwithstanding this professional narrowing of the discourse, the study by Weaver (2009) 
delivers excellent material for the description of suicide as socio-cultural phenomenon. Weaver 
draws a multidimensional and multiparadigmatic network image of suicides in New Zealand and 
Queensland in particular in the first half of the 20th century. He connects the manifold contexts, 
motives, mental, social and physical conditions, (semi-)professional interventions, etc. in 
impressive detail “…providing an intimate understanding of the personal and social 
circumstances surrounding suicide…” (Bayatrizi, 2010, p. 171) and makes this information 
available to readers for further interpretation. Prevailing perspectives and theories are thereby 
relativized and make their way into semantic and pragmatic fields of conflict. “A myriad of 
factors from temperament and personality to environment, learned coping mechanisms, biology 
and life circumstances all create a complicated web of individuality. In light of this fact, perhaps 
our concept of suicidality could be more appropriately viewed as a metaphorical tree.” (Mitchell, 
2009, p. 30) 
If depression and suicidal tendencies are recognized and categorized as ‘products’ of social 
culture (cf. Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999; Yur'yev et al., 2013; Minagawa, 2013; Hjelmeland, 2013, p. 6), 
the evidential authority of medical and psychological theories diminishes (cf. Marsh, 2010, p. 74 
f). Depression is activated and changed by environmental factors and social processes (cf. 
Rosenquist et al., 2011; Petersen, 2011). The environmental factors that encourage depression 
include: social inequality, lack of high-quality democracy in political and economic institutions, 
legal, education and healthcare systems based on privilege, etc. A favorable development in 
society could alleviate most depressions to the extent that far fewer people would require medical 
treatment and the number of suicide and attempted suicides would be significantly reduced. In 
the current social setting, pathologization and medicalisation serve both to treat the afflicted and 
sustain the illness and thus also to support the ruling forces, ‘social stability’, ideologization and 
growth in the participating manufacturing and services sectors. The fact that modern medicine 
and clinical psychology have been successful not only in treating the afflicted but also in their 
humanization and normalization efforts should by no means be denied. Likewise, the dependence 
of medicine and psychology on the field of power and the shortcomings in scientific education 
when it comes to changing prejudices and stereotypes should also be taken into account in the 
assessment of the arguments presented in this article. 
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Cultural and social change and suicidology 
There are sufficient reports about suicide from different cultures and eras which do however 
support the opinion that suicide can be a cultivated and normatively recognized act (cf. Baechler, 
1979; Marsh, 2010; Tomasini, 2012). Many such examples can be found in Roman history and, 
despite censorship, enough corresponding examples have also made it into public view in the 
20th and 21st centuries. However, no group of scientists has as yet dared (or been given the 
resources) to study this thesis from an intercultural and modern society perspective. 
The physical or symbolic violent course of action against people who commit suicide and the 
people who ‘sympathize’ with them stems from Western and other cultural traditions (c.f. 
Baechler, 1979; Baumann, 2001; Bayatrizi, 2008; Feldmann, 2010, p. 192; Marsh, 2010). In 
Western cultures, suicide generally has negative connotations: politics, the law, organized religion, 
medicine and psychiatry are the most important institutions and subsystems which set 
corresponding binding sanctions, prescribe debates and apply physical and symbolic force. 
Emancipation efforts by organized and heterogeneous opponents of this militant truth regime 
have achieved partial successes through the battles between the powers that define the debate 
and practices. However, these successes are, of course, always at risk, since the disciplining of 
suicide and (at least symbolic) destruction of its non-conformist supporters still remains on the 
agenda of powerful conservative groups and organizations.  
“… a contemporary ‘regime of truth’, one centering on a compulsory ontology of pathology in 
relation to suicide” (Marsh, 2010, p. 4) or the contemporary approach to suicide in expert and 
power debates and practices can be compared to the 19th century middle-class attitude to 
sexuality: lack of reflection, over-policing and prudery on the one hand, inadequately cultivated 
and correspondingly brutal social practices on the other, in what was, above all, a largely 
unexplored territory. 
In Western cultures, the concept and practice of suicide was formed and used to discipline and 
stigmatize. Authoritarian regimes and groups, e.g. fundamentalist religious communities or 
national socialism, condemn(ed) self-determined suicide that does (did) not serve the powers that 
be draconically and without reflection. In contrast, ‘sacrificing’ oneself for the ‘true collective’, for 
the ‘true god’ or for the ‘true leader’, which was officially not permitted to be referred to as 
‘altruistic suicide’, was – and is – glorified. Mass murder at the orders of the respective ruling elite 
was praised as being morally good and was also linked with varying good ‘chances of suicide’. 
Representatives of state nobility, law lords, religious and medical leaders continue to regard a 
suicide that is not linked to approved homicide with skepticism and hostility, since the person 
committing suicide is ultimately being insubordinate and abusing his limited authority of self-
determination. These representatives of ‘order’ use withdrawal of capital, defamation of 
character, stigmatization and other tried and tested techniques to battle against people and groups 
who openly support and publicly show acceptance for forms of suicide, e.g.physicians who 
provide assistance with suicide in Oregon, where assisted suicide is legal.  
Many psychiatrists and suicidologists have established justification systems in cooperation with 
religious and state institutions to deny people who want to commit suicide symbolic capital and 
the ability to make their own decisions (cf. Szasz, 1999). This approach has been more successful 
in Europe and North America than in Japan, where certain forms of suicide have long been 
cultivated and normalized (cf. Kitanaka, 2009). Educated Japanese can and may talk more openly 
about suicide in public than their Western counterparts. “Traditionally, suicide has been 
considered an expression of an individual’s free will in Japan (Cho, 2006; Takahashi, 1997, 2001). 
The rhetoric of a ‘suicide of resolve’, still a very popular notion, suggests that suicide can be the 
result of a rational decision by a freely choosing individual, and therefore is an option to be 
respected when necessity calls for it (Kitanaka, 2006, 2008). Kitanaka argues ‘though psychiatry 
has been institutionally established in Japan since the late nineteenth century, psychiatrists have 
had little impact on the way Japanese have conceptualized suicide. This may be because Japanese 
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have long normalized suicide, even aestheticizing it at times as a culturally sanctioned act of 
individual freedom’ (Kitanaka, 2008, 1)” (Ozawa-de Silva, 2010, p. 21-22). 
The ‘understanding’ sold as ‘objective truth’ not inadequately confirmed hypothesis that only a 
few suicides – e.g. one to five percent – are the result of ‘free will’ gives state bodies the 
legitimization they need to take hold of suicide and bring fear and terror to the people involved. 
This fear and barbarization of the field is being instrumentalized theoretically and empirically by 
many psychiatrists and suicidologists to obtain ‘objective findings’ – a typical linking of ‘applied 
science’ and power. 
The suicide experts in the medical system have ‘civilized’, modernized and medicalized the 
custom of post-mortem degradation of people who commit suicide. Even after death, they are 
named and shamed as mentally ill, i.e. as inferior, irresponsible people, and are used as a 
dishonorable and deterring reminder, albeit one mixed with pity. Their relatives are encouraged 
to also place themselves in the care of physicians or psychiatrists. This ‘professional’, ideological 
and economic context fosters a world view in which suicide as such – regardless of social and 
cultural setting – has in almost all cases seriously disturbing and no positive effects on surviving 
relatives or persons of reference. The confirmation of this normative hypothesis, which has never 
been adequately tested, was questioned, for example, in the study by Barraclough and Hughes 
(1987) (cf. Jordan, 2001, p. 97). Through social normalization and medicalization, suicides and 
the mourning processes of the people they leave behind become events that distract from or 
complicate the resolution of social and hegemonic problems. Psychosocial disorders can, of 
course, emerge, when a person’s passing and death are not compatible with the interpretive 
systems and practices of the people left behind. While suicides probably cause “complicated 
grief” for many survivors, a successful cultivation and liberalization of self-determined dying 
could reduce this potential strain (cf. Swarte et al., 2003). People are physically, mentally and 
socially damaged and weakened by the social conditions, only to then receive ‘aid’ that doesn’t 
make them ‘healthy’ and ‘happy’ but dependent and submissive.  
When suicidal actions are recognized as normal actions or even interpreted as morally sound, 
political, religious and other guardians of morality and the ruling order vehemently oppose such 
understanding and demand sovereignty of interpretation (cf. Bayatrizi, 2008, p. 121). Suicide 
messages that could be understood as a protest or criticism of the social, political or economic 
regime should be ignored or reinterpreted – a process that has been seen in different forms 
throughout European history (ibid., p. 117).  
23 France Télécom employees took their own lives or attempted to commit suicide in 2008 and 
2009. The suicide notes and the statements of the survivors clearly indicate that the working 
environment was a central factor in their decision to commit suicide. Economic and social 
exclusion (e.g. unemployment) contribute to raising suicide rates (cf. Yur’yev et al., 2013).  
Suicide is a socio-cultural phenomenon (c.f. Chu et al., 2010; Hjelmeland, 2010) like war, financial 
transactions, divorce and unmarked graves. Most people would shake their heads if physicians 
and scientists were to say that war, financial transactions, divorce and unmarked graves are 
inextricably linked with illness and incapacitation and assign them to the realms of medicine and 
clinical psychology. The socio-cultural perspective is confirmed in intercultural studies (cf. the 
reports in Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, No. 2, 2012). “In conclusion, our findings suggest 
that the ‘monolithic’ psychiatric discourse (Marsh 2010, p. 168) that dominates Western 
suicidology, and that has been built largely on the basis of psychological autopsy interviews, is not 
supported by a close reading of the personal narratives that are woven by bereaved kinfolk in the 
course of those interviews.” (Owens & Lambert 2012, p. 369). 
The autopsy of suicides 
By studying suicides after the event, researchers endeavor to find out more about the causes of 
such actions. Specific interpretations of the results of such ‘autopsy studies’ are used to 
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‘legitimize’ the dogmatic claim and taken for granted belief that mental illness is the cause in 
almost all cases (Jamison, 1999, 100; Cording & Saß, 2009; Jox, 2011, p. 169). Psychological 
autopsy studies are driven by deficit- and illness-based approaches, i.e. they deliver the results 
from the desired perspectives (cf. Rogers & Lester, 2010, p. 13), and are designed and conducted 
on a low methodological level. “PA [psychological autopsy] studies can therefore not serve as an 
evidence base for the claim that most people who die by suicide are mentally ill.” (Hjelmeland et 
al., 2012, 621) Competence, reflection, contextual relevance, alternative constructions of meaning 
and the world and other epistemic, cultural and social aspects are blanked out or ‘neutralized’ 
from the start (cf. Fincham et al., 2011), and the narrow and theoretical weak operationalization 
serves to justify scientifically dubious claims (cf. Pompili, 2011, p. 10 ff). “Cavanagh et al.’s (2003) 
systematic review of psychological autopsy studies noted that evidence from these studies on 
psycho-social factors is limited.” (Scourfield et al., 2012, p. 467) 
Even the term ‘autopsy’ is itself deceptive: as if diffuse, prejudiced ‘gleanings’ might be 
comparable to a (ideally) scientifically based post-mortem examination. Through this ‘scientific 
tradition’ supported and sanctified by an illusion of validity (Kahneman, 2011, p. 211), valuable 
information is hidden in constricted interpretative mantles or not made available to the public. 
Through the autopsy of suicide, a living context is treated as a pathologized corpse. It is to be 
presumed that one function of the psychological autopsy of suicides is to provide an ‘epistemic 
cleansing’ of a dangerous alternative field for the doxic structures of medicine, politics and the 
law. 
In comparison to other studies from developed nations, autopsy studies in China find that mental 
disorders account for a significantly lower proportion of the ‘causes’ of suicides (cf. the 
references provided in Phillips, 2010). Phillips (2010) discusses this discrepancy in the expected 
ideological and dogmatic manner. First, he sticks to the fiction of a universally objective 
definition of ‘mental disorder’ and, second, he confirms without reflection the supervision 
postulate: ‘suicide must be prevented regardless of its individual and group-specific 
interpretation, even when it is not caused by a mental disorder!’ 
 
Epistemic and normative front and back stages in suicidology 
In this section, the behavioral norms for psychiatrists and psychologists outlined in expert 
literature or encountered in the attitudes and expectations of other people are confronted with 
the assumed actual behavior of suicide therapists (behavior which still needs to be studied 
empirically). 
- The values of the potential suicide victim should be recognized. – Yet they are ‘interpreted’ and 
‘transformed’ by the experts. 
- The context should be determined. – Yet it must be boiled down to the “clinical conditions’. 
- The potential suicide victim should be taken seriously. – Yet all tricks should be used to alter 
the meaning and system that supports the suicidal tendencies. 
- The potential suicide victim is cognitively and emotionally capable of carrying out a project that 
the majority of people would not be able to do. – Yet in line with the professional doxa, he/she 
must be ‘understood’ to be cognitively and emotionally deficient and incompetent. 
- Some people in positions of responsibility recognize some acts of suicide as dignified and 
purely personal. – Yet an orthodox suicidologist cannot recognize an act of suicide as dignified 
and purely personal under any circumstances. 
- The act of suicide can be planned and carried out on the basis of a strong moral decision. – The 
suicidologist must class the moral and the conscience of the potential suicide victim as 
secondary to the illness construct and thus devalue them. 
- Each potential suicide victim and each suicide is unique, and hence a set of predefined actions 
for professionals based on a model that offers no alternatives must be rejected. – Yet suicide 
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prevention has to address all suicides, regardless of understanding, context, values and other 
aspects. 
Values and freedom 
The conflicts in the suicide field result from values and diverging interests, whereby open, 
controversial and empirically based public discussions are generally avoided, even though suicide 
is an important, multifunctional aspect of the life world especially in pluralistic knowledge 
societies.  
Some psychiatrists and suicidologists seek to preserve a sector-specific monopoly when it comes 
to assessing freedom to act. Freedom is transformed into ability or competence, which is 
established and measured by psychiatrists. They can then set standards, stigmatize people 
legitimately as not free to exercise their own will and thus also recruit them for purposes of 
political or economic gain as (forced) clients. The valuable ‘energy of suicidal tendencies’ is 
medicalized through mainstream therapy and thus used to preserve the medical system, not to 
further society. 
A psychiatrist cannot ‘freely’ perceive and accept a potential suicide candidate. Psychiatrists are 
forced to apply prescribed professional and institutional theories and practices. These constrained 
secular priests protect and armor plate the prevailing ‘truth’, the law, the organization and other 
powerful institutions from the ‘demons’. 
Many suicidologists and psychiatrists unduly claim to have brought clarity to the 3,000-year-old 
debate on free will. All the ignorant have to do is to contact them, and they will tell them if they 
and others are acting of their own ‘free’ will or not. The ‘free will experts’ ignore the fact that free 
will, ego, self, identity, person, subject, etc. are precarious, changing concepts and constructions 
steered by money and power, dependent on perspectives, habitus, socio-cultural and other 
conditions. The ‘theories’ they use, and the ‘empirical evidence’ they produce – when forced to 
do so – do not of course meet the strict scientific criteria that should be applied in such 
existential matters (cf. Wedler, 2008, 319). There is a lack of reference in psychiatric and 
suicidology texts to the fact that ‘free will’, ‘free choice’ or ‘free mind’ in modern society are not 
restricted primarily by mental illness, but by socio-economic disadvantage, the consolidation of 
structures of privilege and economic and political decisions that lead, among other things, to 
mental disorders. Guardians and protectors of suicide sell their specific ‘technologies of free will 
and the self’ without drawing attention to (un)desired side effects (cf. Rose, 2007). There is also a 
lack of recognition in psychiatry and suicidology that free will and autonomy discourses also 
constitute goods, capital and weapons in a capitalist society – e.g. in the political or medical 
business – framed by habitus and field, and that heteronomy and autonomy do not mill around 
separately anywhere. A person can achieve autonomy through ‘restriction’ of awareness and can 
be made dependent or turned into a submissive producer and consumer and defender of social 
inequality by the purchase of freedom, e.g. in therapy. 
‘Unfreedom’ of will and loss of self are achieved to a far greater extent by medical measures, 
above all those to prolong dying, than they are by suicide. In dying processes in hospitals, care 
homes, hospices and palliative wards, organizational reasons and the artificial prolongation of life 
result for the clients in a forced reality and strong restrictions on their actions – a favorable 
climate for suicidal thoughts. High quality empirical studies into this subject have so far been 
avoided. The usual story told by the caregivers is that suicidal wishes do not arise under these 
conditions. Yet these “experiences” are the result of a combination of the following elements: 
firstly, that the patients no longer have the energy and courage for deviation and self-
determination, secondly, that they are no longer being heard (or should no longer be heard) and 
thirdly, the dismantling and destruction of their social and mental life world. Suicidal tendencies 
in old people are often signs of a highly developed social and mental identity – which is usually 
linked to an above-average ‘freedom as competence’ (cf. Applbaum, 2012; Baudelot & Establet 
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2008, p. 33-34). An important factor that favors suicidal tendencies is namely the obstruction of 
autonomy and independence as a result of the context (cf. Ehrenberg, 1998). In care homes, the 
competences required to live and die with dignity are already reduced to such an extent that only 
suicidal quasi-acts remain possible, the interpretation and symbolic conversion of which is left to 
the responsibility of the care staff. 
Insights into the pathology of the psychiatric profession 
Many physicians and psychiatrists are pulled in by their professionally laced corsets, and act in an 
unreflective and ritualized manner. The following citations offer examples: 
“It is estimated that close to 90% of people who suicide have a psychiatric diagnosis at the time 
of their death … But, argue those in favour of physician-assisted suicide, this does not apply to 
those with terminal illness. These are not people with despairing emotional states but rather 
rational human beings wanting a sensible degree of control over the circumstances of their death 
(Tucker and Steele, 2007). Again, the data simply do not support this. Patients with terminal 
illness wanting to hasten their own death have been found to have higher rates of depressive 
symptom scores, lower family cohesion and a greater sense of being a burden on their families 
(Kelly et al., 2004). The strongest predictive factor for a wish to hasten death in those with 
terminal illness is not pain, or health status, but hopelessness (Akechi et al., 2001; Breitbart et al., 
2000; Chochinov et al., 1998).” (Vamos, 2012, p. 85) 
Elements of the ritualized argumentation: 90%, data, depression, burden, hopelessness. That it is 
not about “data” but about doxa, that depression can also be a resource, that hopelessness does 
not ‘exclude’ rational thought and behavior – these are all things that are not allowed to be 
thought and written. According to a study by Kogan, Tucker & Porter (2011), social economic 
burden is a central attitude factor, while psychiatrists vilify it as a symptom of illness – not least 
because it serves only too well as a reminder of their own economic interests and those of their 
clients. 
“Patients who desire death during a serious or terminal illness are usually suffering from treatable 
depression (Breitbart, 1987; Breitbart, 1990)” (Sher, 2012, p. 87). Implicit postulate: What’s 
treatable, must be treated, even if the treatment is not adequate for the habitus or has a 
depersonalizing effect. Implicit value judgment: if a depression is a ‘cause’ of the desire to 
shorten the process of dying, the physician must act dogmatically against this wish regardless of 
other considerations. Implicit scientific norm: deviating hypotheses must be concealed and 
symbolically destroyed. 
“A request for assisted suicide is usually a call for help and a sign of depression (Greene, 2006). It 
is a call for positive alternatives as solutions for real, difficult problems.” (Sher, 2012, p. 87) 
Implicit dogmatic understanding of reality (sign of inadequate scientific theory and professional 
training): the physician knows better than the patient about the latter’s ‘whole person’. The 
physician is a priest, only he can interpret such calls for help correctly. 
“The wish to die is not stable over time. Suicidal intent is typically transient. Of those who 
attempt suicide but are stopped, less than 4% go on commit suicide in the next 5 years (Rosen, 
1976) and less than 11% will kill themselves over the next 35 years (Dahlgren, 1977).” (Sher, 
2012, p. 88). Implicit insight: if stopped from committing suicide, a person who only has a few 
weeks left to live would not kill himself/herself over the next 35 years. Implicit value judgment: 
instable patient wishes should be disregarded by physicians. 
“In some countries, governments and insurance companies may put pressure on physicians and 
hospital administrators to avoid life-saving measures or recommend euthanasia or assisted 
suicide.” (Sher, 2012, p. 88) Implicit unverified factual claim: in most cases, physicians act 
without external social pressure primarily in the interests of their clients. Implicit standard: 
external social pressure on physicians should be categorically assessed as negative. 
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The suicidologist Wolfersdorf (2007) lists overlapping types or forms of suicide without 
convincing theoretical basis, but omits to name “rational suicide”or “accepted suicide” (p. 20). 
The type of suicide discussed in this section (suicide that is legally and socially worth protecting) 
corresponds most to Wolfersdorf’s category of “so-called Freitod” (killing oneself in the absence 
of mental, somatic or social need)”. It goes without saying that this type is de facto non-existent. 
Why suicide cannot be committed “of free will”, “rationally” and “socially accepted” ‘in the 
presence of mental, somatic or social need’ remains a secret of the experts. “…the data do not 
support the idea that suicide cannot be chosen rationally or that it is never chosen rationally, or 
even that it is rarely chosen rationally.” (Luper, 2009, p. 181). 
The following quote further emphasizes the professional tunnel vision: “Those people who 
frequently encounter older people in suicidal crises or following an attempted suicide in their 
work know that acts of suicide by older people are practically always caused by situations of 
emotional suffering, frequently in combination with external misery, and are not the result of a 
level-headed, rational decision (cf. Teising, 2001). What is dangerous is that the person who 
interprets the suicidal considerations of an older person as ‘rational’ is less willing to provide 
help.” (Wächtler, Erlemeier & Teising, 2008, p. 134; translation by the author) 
The usual prejudices and stereotypes return: the intention to commit suicide is not ‘rational’. 
Only if a suicidologist were to confirm the ‘rationality’ would acceptance perhaps be an option. 
Only professional helpers can define what ‘help’ means. People who provide help that does not 
conform to the dogma, e.g. who help someone to commit suicide, are threatened. 
Even a suicidologist at the Max-Planck-Institute for Psychiatry submits to the accepted dogmatic 
frame of reference: “It is ultimately the ambivalence of the actual person at risk of suicide that 
contradicts the prerequisite for a suicide, namely a decision for death and against life that is made 
of one’s own free will.” (Bronisch, 2007, p. 124; translation by the author). Bronisch uses the 
term ‘ambivalence’ in an individual psychology or personality theory context. As the typical 
suicide in line with the psychiatric construction, Bronisch champions a restricted 
(monodisciplinary) perspective. Ambivalence and ambiguity are now normal phenomena in the 
dying process (cf. Valentine, 2008, 36 f; Broom & Cavenagh, 2011). In this intricate situation, 
insight is not gained from a psychiatric prophesy that indicates the profession’s conservative 
ideology and epistemic dogmatic, but from multiperspective, transdisciplinary reflection. 
Constitutive is an anthropological or existential ambivalence that has been worked on in all 
cultures and for which there is no categorical ‘solution’ (cf. Hadders, 2011, p. 231). A cultural 
ambivalence can be discerned in the two key Western death scenes, namely those of Socrates and 
Jesus Christ (the latter of which was discussed by John Donne (1647/1982) as a suicide): a high 
share of suicide with a simultaneous official emphasis on the legitimate or illegitimate killing 
depending on the perspective. Social ambivalence would appear to be more relevant for today’s 
situation, and is demonstrated in the fact that killing has been monopolized by the state and its 
loyal servants, which is why killers who are not commissioned by state officials are subject to the 
threat of severe punishment, while suicide is now no longer liable to prosecution. The 
professional ambivalence can be seen in the attitudes and behavior of many psychiatrists and 
suicidologists: officially providing help, unofficially misleading, punishing, humiliating, 
constricting and weakening. These socio-cultural ambivalences are reflected in the appreciations 
of many people and also emerge in study findings: an increasing number of people accept active 
euthanasia, thus advocate individual mercy killing in a state-controlled setting, yet still have 
concerns when it comes to suicide (cf., for example, Tännsjö, 2006). Tännsjö expresses his 
astonishment over this result with social scientific naivety and philosophical arrogance: “My 
interpretation of this discrepancy is that people generally have no well thought out opinion on 
these matters.” (ibid. 44; translation by the author). Brock (1992, p. 21) maintains that people 
seek active euthanasia or active assisted suicide because an (unassisted and unauthorized) suicide 
would bring stigmatization to them and their loved ones. 
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Dogmatists, paternalists and believers in verification do not want or are unable to recognize that 
more and more people are ambivalently and multivalently rejecting the purity ideals and 
restrictions of autonomy in theological, medical, legal and philosophical treatises, church and 
other pamphlets, medical association communiques and soap-box oratories (cf. Dawson, 2012). 
A representative longitudinal study of the population over the age of 64 carried out in The 
Netherlands from 2001 to 2009 shows that an increasing number of old people support actively 
assisted suicide and easier access to the ‘end-of-life pill’. (Buiting et al., 2012). 
We would like to close this section with another illustrative comparison. The findings of 
empirical research into the attitudes of teachers to migrant children (Auernheimer, 2008, p. 461), 
can be transferred astoundingly well to the attitudes of many psychiatrists and suicidologists to 
people who (attempt to) commit suicide: 
1. Fixation on other ‘mentalities’, 
2. Blindness to difference (differences between groups and individuals), 
3. Global suspicion of ‘fundamentalism’ (own ‘fundamentalism’ is transferred to the client), 
4. Demand for assimilation and normalization, 
5. Exclusive ‘tolerance’, 
6. Mission (cure, prevention), 
7. No questioning of individual perception and assessment patterns, 
8. Infantilization, assumption of irrationality and immaturity. 
Result of the diagnosis of the suicidological framework in psychiatric organizations: ritualized 
practices and a dogmatic doxa are legitimized through a body of knowledge with an inadequate 
theoretical and methodological base that is designed to maintain relations of power which 
promote inequality and is immune to criticism. 
The field of self-determined and externally-determined dying 
Self-determination and external determination are analytical concepts, i.e. they can be changed 
and adapted in accordance with theories, the context and personal semantics. When a person in a 
care home refuses to eat, experts describe this as self-destructive behavior, although it could be 
seen from a personal and from a scientific perspective as self-fulfilling behavior. Self-descriptions 
provided by elderly, ill people, particularly those who have to live in total institutions, are 
generally ignored and rarely recognized by the professionals, who reinterpret them in line with 
their own ‘theories’ and interests. The apparently objective ‘diagnosis of reality’ by professionals 
or even by other regulatory bodies, e.g. police officers or judges, transpires to be a dogmatic, 
pseudo universal, perspectival external description. 
From a critical, interdisciplinary perspective, suicidality is not just a consequence of the effect of 
‘inner powers’ (psychology, medicine) or ‘external powers’ (sociology), it is a relation or habitus 
disposition within a field (Bourdieu, 1998, 2000). Accordingly, understanding and explaining 
suicidality is a pragmatic, dynamic and multiperspective activity on the micro-, meso- and macro-
levels, the scientific observation of which is poor and lacking in current psychiatric theories (cf. 
Rogers & Lester, 2010). A critical debate on suicide and its diversities attacks political, economic 
and professional relations and demands a fair context for autonomy and humanization to unfold.  
The recognition of self-determined planning of dying, in which suicide, assisted suicide and 
euthanasia were options, would be a step on the path towards destigmatization, humanization 
and liberalization. The rational suicide construct is, however, hardly suitable for such a cultivation 
discourse, since it is used in the literature and expert debate in an oscillatory, interest-dependent 
manner that dismisses empirical evidence (cf. Wittwer, 2003, 49; Fenner, 2008, p. 283).  
Ultimately, the determining factor is not how rational a decision to commit suicide is to the 
experts, but that the circumstances of life allow people to make decisions in their own interest – 
either alone or with their loved ones or persons of reference – about whether to extend or 
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shorten their physical, psychic and social lives (cf. Feldmann, 2010, p. 126-139). Yet a structural 
approach of this kind is marginalized in suicidology and psychiatry. 
Prevention: There is no alternative! There is an alternative: Cultivation! 
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